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I. Introduction
Seeking to ground antitrust in theoretical economics,1 we too often forget how
deeply rooted and pervasive political, cultural, and historical values are in antitrust
regulation and enforcement.2 In the words of former American Antitrust Institute
Chairman Bert Foer, “antitrust should not be an isolated island grounded in
theoretical models, but must be firmly attached to the mainland of political and
economic life in America and elsewhere.”3
Following the values-driven assertion of Chicago School disciples that “[b]asic
microeconomic theory is of course a science,”4 American antitrust enforcement has
sought since the late 1970s, to ground itself in supposedly neutral and scientific
neoclassical economic models.5 Unfortunately, as the United States, the founder of

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
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Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Retrospective and Perspective: Where Are We Coming
From? Where Are We Going? in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 2, 3 (H. First, E.
Fox & R. Pitofsky eds., 1991) (arguing that antitrust analyses have been “seduced by siren calls of
theoretical [economic] purity”).
See e.g., Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2543, 2544 (2013) (discussing “the democratic, economic, and political goals of the antitrust laws”);
Fox & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing how antitrust’s strength flows from its “core values,”
including “a preference for pluralism, freedom of trade, access to markets, and freedom of choice”);
Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C.L. REV. 551, 556 (2012) (noting how
“some enforcers [have] viewed antitrust’s more . . . political, social, and moral goals as somehow
diluting antitrust policy,” and how “some courts and enforcers [have] sacrificed important political,
social, and moral values to promote certain economic beliefs”); Robert Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Thomas J. Horton, Competition or Monopoly?
The Implications of Complexity Science, Chaos Theory, and Evolutionary Biology for Antitrust and
Competition Policy, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 195, 201 (2006) (“The history of the continuing debates as
to antitrust legislation and regulation reveals that how people think about antitrust issues is
generally tied to their underlying assumptions and premises, as well as their implied values”);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 (1978) (discussing the
fundamental disagreements about “the goals or values the [antitrust] law[s] may legitimately and
profitably implement”).
Albert Foer e-mail of December 31, 2014, to American Antitrust Institute Advisory Board (copy on
file with author). Mr. Foer adds: “Antitrust plays a crucial role within a democratic political
economy, doing its part to define the best balance for the time, recognizing the state of knowledge,
of technology, and of institutional realities.” Id.
BORK, supra note 2, at 8. Judge Richard Posner long has argued that Chicago School economics
are “scientific, not ideological.” RUDOLPH J.R. RERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW 228 (1996), discussing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973);
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
Thomas J. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust: China’s Emerging Approach to Anti-Monopoly
Law, 47 INT’L LAW 193, 204 (2013) (discussing the “conservative economic agenda that has
dominated American antitrust since the 1980s”); First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2545 (discussing
America’s “move away from more democratically controlled institutions toward greater reliance on
technical experts”); Stucke, supra note 2, at 563-66 (discussing the ascendance of neoclassical
economic theories in antitrust jurisprudence since the late 1970s); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons
for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the ‘TooBig-to-Fail’ Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 281 (observing that “’Post-Chicago’
antitrust theory departs from the Chicago School views mostly around the margins”).
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antitrust regulation, enters into its 126th year of antitrust regulation and
enforcement, some critics, including this author, believe that the lax antitrust
enforcement that began in the 1980s,6 has catalyzed a “slide of [American] antitrust
into political irrelevance.”7
Ironically, however, antitrust regulation and enforcement today is thriving
globally.8 One country where antitrust enforcement is taking off is China, which is
entering into only its eighth year of antitrust regulation and enforcement.9 China’s
ascendance as a global antitrust enforcer is especially ironic, as until the late 1970s,
China viewed the term competition as a “capitalist monster.”10
Although “anti-monopoly efforts are a very new phenomenon in China,”11 China
today finds itself under an intense global microscope. “Though many jurisdictions
have adopted competition laws in recent decades, none of those laws has engendered
the level of interest sparked by China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML).”12 Such

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

See e.g. Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST, supra note 2,
at 530 (“During the 1980s, we witnessed the most lenient antitrust enforcement program in fifty
years”); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 10 (“…the blueprint of the Reagan Administration has not
been seriously shaken…European competition policy has surpassed American policy in its vigilance
against anticompetitive restraints”); Stucke, supra note 2, at 553-557 (describing how “antitrust’s
influence in the United States has diminished”).
First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2543; See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:
PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 1-10 (2005); Jonathon B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The
Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76
ANTITRUST L. J. 605 (2010).
See e.g. Stucke, supra note 2, at 551-552 (“The past twenty years witnessed more countries with
antitrust laws and the birth and growth of the international organization of governmental
competition authorities, the International Competition Network (ICN), with over 100 member
countries”).
“In August 2008, 118 years after the Sherman Act and 50 years after the Treaty of Rome, China’s
own Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) came into effect.” CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE
YEARS xxxvii (Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass, eds., 2013); see also Wing Gar Cheng, China’s
Watchdog intensifies efforts to enforce regulatory conditions, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013) (“. . .
the country’s relatively young antitrust regime is moving towards a more complete and enforced
regulatory framework”).
Xiaoye Wang, The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in Progress, 54 ANTITRUST
BULL. 579, 580 (2009); See also Stucke, supra note 2, at 552. In China’s 1980 Political Economic
Dictionary, “’competition’ was defined as ‘fighting between producers for economic benefit, under a
system of private ownership;’ in a capitalist system, ‘due to competition and lack of government
planning in production, society’s labour and resources cannot achieve rational allocation or full
utilization, leading to a serious waste of productive power…without government control, regulation
of competition and production is ineffectual.’” WANG supra note 10, at 30, quoting POLITICAL
ECONOMICS DICTIONARY 597-99 (Xu Dixin, ed., 1980).
CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at xxxvii.
H. STEPHEN HARRIS, JR., PETER J. WANG, YIZHE ZHANG, MARK A. COHEN & SEBASTIAN J. EVRARD,
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 8 (2011). The reasons for the high level of global
interest include: “the sheer scale and astounding growth of China’s markets, the vast amounts of
foreign capital invested in China, the burgeoning sales of Chinese goods abroad, the substantial
growth in the participation of Chinese firms in foreign markets, and a recognition of the significant
challenge posed by the establishment of free market competition in China’s socialist market
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international scrutiny seems natural and expected given that the promulgation of
China’s AML can “be regarded as a great achievement of international
cooperation.”13 Furthermore, as observed by former U.S. Antitrust AAG Hewitt
Pate, “U.S. and European officials have often approached China like a recruiting
prospect – as a new player to be won over to U.S. or European styles of antitrust.”14
Although China’s legal system and anti-monopoly regulatory efforts are still “a
work in progress,”15 key trends and patterns in China’s enforcement of its AML are
emerging. First and foremost, China is aggressively charting its own course.16
China sees its AML enforcement as an integral part of its mission of “safeguarding
market order and achieving social fairness and justice [in] establish[ing] an initial
law regime for the socialist market economy.”17 China’s leaders view “socialism with
Chinese characteristics and the Chinese dream [as] the main theme of our age.”18
So it should hardly come as a surprise or shock anyone that China will continue to
see one of its primary anti-monopoly missions as carrying out AML Article 1’s
mandate of “promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy.”19
Of course, the Chinese are astute enough to recognize that it was the United

13.

14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
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economy.” Id.
XIAOYE WANG, THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 313 (2014). Professor Wang
further notes: “[I]t is no surprise that many good provisions from other well-established antitrust
laws have been incorporated into the Chinese AML.” Id. See also Horton, Confucianism and
Antitrust, supra note 5, at 196 (“American, European, and Japanese antitrust and competition
regulators, lawyers, and economists have taken understandable pride in counseling and helping
China in drafting, adopting, and interpreting its new AML”); HARRIS, ET AL., supra note 12, at 2-3
(“The core provisions of the AML were modeled on EU competition law, and to a lesser extent, on
the laws of the United States, Germany, Japan, and other countries”).
R. Hewitt Pate, What I Heard in the Great Hall of the People – Realistic Expectations of Chinese
Antitrust, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 195 (2008). See also Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note
5, at 212.
Pittman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 465, 486 (2004).
See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND
THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL Order 582 (2d ed. 2012) (“It would be wrong to assume that [China]
will behave like the West; that cannot be discounted, but history suggests something different”);
Thomas Velk, Olivia Gong & Ariel S.N. Zuckerbrot, A Trans-Pacific Partnership, 60(1) ANTITRUST
BULL. 4, 5 (2015) (“By means of a unique, clearly evident capacity to mix, balance, and then apply
its own special plays and stratagems, China will evolve into a highly efficient but quite different
superpower from the United States”); Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 212
(“China’s long and impressive history and culture, however, ensure that China will do what it has
done throughout its long history—chart its own course”); JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN,
CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 164 (2006) (arguing that China’s market economy will “be to a large extent
in Chinese hands”).
The State Council Info. Office, China, China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of
Law, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L LAW 513, 514-17 (2008).
See e.g. CCP Document No. 9, April 22, 2013, Communique on the Current State of the Ideological
Sphere: A Notice from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s General Office,
translation available at http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
AML, Ch. I, art. 1.
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States “that smoothed the way for Beijing’s entry into the World Trade
Organization.”20 They also know that they owe a substantial part of their “economic
miracle” to trade with the West.21 So there is little doubt that the Chinese are likely
to continue “selectively adapting elements of Western learning and technology to
China’s needs.”22
This does not mean, however, that China is likely to follow western Chicago
School economic theories in interpreting or enforcing its Anti-Monopoly Laws.23
China is unapologetically basing its current AML enforcement activities and
decisions on social, political and moral, as well as economic, considerations.24
“China’s leaders believe that economic and social responsibilities exist together and
cannot meaningfully be separated.”25
Whether we like it or not, China’s leaders suspect that many in the West are
trying “to obscure the essential differences between the West’s value system and the
value system [the Chinese] advocate, ultimately using the West’s value systems to

20.

21.

22.
23.
24.

25.

Andrew Jacobs, The War of Words in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014; see also JACQUES, supra note
16, at 580 (“As a rising power, [China] has been obliged to converge with and adapt to the existing
international norms, and in particular to defer to and mollify the present superpower, the United
States, since the latter’s cooperation and tacit support have been preconditions for China’s wider
acceptance”).
See e.g., Jacobs, supra note 20. (“[S]ince the 1980s, when the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping urged his
people to learn from the West in an effort to tackle endemic poverty, Chinese leaders have set aside
their economic cudgels. In the decades that followed, Adam Smith-style market economics turned
former factory workers into millionaires…”); Xiaoye Wang, WTO Accession and the Formulation of
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, in WANG, supra note 13, at 99 (“Entering the WTO in 2001 was a
milestone for China’s economic reforms. This significant event not only indicated that the Chinese
economic system had been generally transformed into a market economy system, but also signified
China’s increased integration with the rest of the world and the increasing globalization of the
Chinese economy”).
JONATHON D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 216 (1990). See also Velk, Gong &
Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 10 (China “is now undergoing a process through which it may
amalgamate its natural culture with some of the better social and economic ideas of the west”).
See, e.g., JACQUES, supra note 16, at 563 (arguing that China will continue developing “in very much
its own way, based on its own history and traditions, which will owe little or nothing to any Western
inheritance”).
See e.g. Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 213 (“China’s future AML
enforcement is likely to be based on social, moral, and political considerations”); JACQUES, supra
note 16, 562 (“The reason for China’s transformation . . . has been the way it has succeeded in
combining what it has learnt from the West, and also its East Asian neighbours, with its own
history and culture, thereby tapping and releasing its own native sources of dynamism”).
Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 213. See also Geoffrey Kok Heng See,
Harmonious Society and Chinese CSR: Is There Really a Link? 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 2 (2009)
(discussing the CCP’s recognition that it must deal with social and economic issues as an interwoven
“national priority”); Harmonious Society, The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China
(Sept.
30,
2007,
9:14
AM),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/921691/92211/6274973.html, at 1-2 (discussing how
economic growth in China must be balanced by tackling serious social and economic dislocations).
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supplant the core values of Socialism.”26 As an example, when China’s President Xi
Jinping first came to power in October, 2013, he blasted what he characterized as
western efforts to “denigrate the socialist system– all to promote the Euro-American
model of capitalism and constitutionalism.”27 President Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao,
similarly warned that “international forces are intensifying the strategic plot of
Westernizing and dividing China”, and called on his countrymen to “sound the alarm
and remain vigilant.”28
China’s leaders consequently are seeking to eschew the teachings and ideologies
of unrestrained free-market economics that have underpinned the United States’
antitrust enforcement efforts since the late 1970s.29 Blasting neoliberalism, China’s
leaders allege that Western critics “aim to change [China’s] economic infrastructure
and weaken the government’s control of the national economy.”30 CCP Document
No. 9, for example, charges: “They brag on about how we should use Western
standards to achieve so-called ‘thorough reform.’”31 The harsh rhetoric currently
coming from China indicates that “[a]fter a lull in xenophobia, anti-Western
invective [in China] is back.”32

26.

27.
28.
29.

30.

Doc. No. 9, supra note 18. “Document No. 9, as it [is] known, called for eradicating seven subversive
strains of thinking. Beginning with ‘Western constitutional democracy.’ The list included press
freedom, civic participation, ‘universal values’ of human rights, and what it described as ‘nihilist’
interpretations of the Party’s history. The ‘seven taboos’ were delivered to university professors
and social media celebrities, who were warned not to cross the line.” EVAN OSNOS, AGE OF
AMBITION: CHASING FORTUNE, TRUTH, AND FAITH IN THE NEW CHINA 365-66 (2014).
Id. at 365.
Id. at 319.
For example, CCP Document No. 9 additionally excoriates Western efforts at “promoting
Neoliberalism, [and] attempting to change China’s basic economic system.” Doc. No. 9, supra note
18. See also Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, The Chinese Communist Party (Nov. 17, 2014) available
at http://www.cfr.org/china/chinese-communist-party/p29443; Chris Buckley, China Takes Aim at
Western Ideas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2013; Noah Feldman, CCP’s Plan for Pro-Democracy Voices:
Repression, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013; Andrew McKillop, China’s 7 Perils Are All Western, MKT.
ORACLE, Aug. 20, 2013 (discussing Document No. 9’s criticisms of the doctrines of “free markets”
and “neo-liberalism”); Stanley Lubman, Document No. 9: The Party Attacks Western Democratic
Ideals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2013.
Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at pt 4. The CCP’s Document No. 9 adds:
Neoliberalism advocates unrestrained economic liberalization, complete privatization, and
total marketization, and it opposes any kind of interference by the state. Western
countries like the United States, carry out their neoliberal agendas under the guise of
‘globalization,’ visiting catastrophic consequences…[including] the international financial
crisis from [which] they have yet to recover.

31.
32.
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Doc. No. 9, supra, note 18. The Document continues: “Essentially they oppose the general and
specific policies emanating from the road taken at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress
and they oppose socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Andrew Jacobs, The War of Words in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014. See also Murong Xuecan,
The New Face of China’s Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2013; Orville Schell, Comrade Xi’s
Choice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2014, at C1. (“The party’s strenuous denunciation of such ‘hostile forces’
is instructive. It suggests that our own assumptions over the past few decades – that open markets
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China’s determination to chart its own antitrust course without following or
adhering to western ideologies has resulted in four major trends during the first six
years of AML enforcement. First, China aspires to protect and buttress its socialist
market economy by safeguarding what it perceives to be “fair market competition”
and the “consumer and public interests” of China’s citizens.33 Second, China is
determined to protect at all costs its own perceived long-term security and economic
interests. Third, China is focused on protecting its indigenous business and
entrepreneurs, including its diverse multitude of small and medium-sized
businesses. And, fourth, China is demonstrating a strong propensity to focus on
potential barriers to entry and the use of exclusionary practices by dominant firms.
China’s AML enforcement activities have drawn harsh and scathing criticism
from Western governmental and business interests—especially those in the United
States.34 Major themes of such criticisms are that China “is relying on noncompetition factors” in its antitrust analyses and enforcement actions, especially in
the context of international mergers and acquisitions, and the protection of
Intellectual Property (IP) rights; and that China is discriminating against foreign
businesses and countries through uneven enforcement of its AML laws.35 “According
to Lester Ross, Vice Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, this
is a strategy by the Chinese government to help its domestic companies catch up in
industries in which they are lagging.”36
This article first reviews the major emerging trends in China’s current AML
enforcement efforts, and how they relate to China’s social, political, and economic
values, culture, and history (Pt. II A-C). The article then discusses some of the recent

33.
34.
35.

36.

would somehow lead inevitably to open societies and redirect China from what President Bill
Clinton once called ‘the wrong side of history’—were pipe dreams.”).
AML supra, note 19, at Ch. I, Art. 1.
See, e.g., Velk, Gong & Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 9 (“In 2014, many American and other foreign
companies claimed that they were singled out in antitrust investigations that discriminated against
non-Chinese corporations”).
See e.g. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Second Annual GCR
Live Conference, Antitrust Enforcement in China—What’s Next? (Sept. 16, 2014), at 3-4 (“…a
growing chorus is claiming that the Chinese are using the AML to promote industrial policy…[and]
the AML may be used to protect and promote domestic industry”); U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Competing Interests in China’s Competition Law Enforcement, Sept. 9, 2014, at ii (“…China’s
remedies often appear designed to advance industrial policy and boost national champions, AMEAs
rely insufficiently on sound economic analysis, intellectual property rights have been curtailed in
the name of competition law, and AML enforcement suffers from procedural and due process
shortcomings. These patterns in AML enforcement give rise to growing concern about the quality
and fairness of enforcement, and they raise legitimate questions about China’s commitment to the
global antitrust commons.…”).
Velk, Gong & Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 9. See also China Targeting Foreign Companies,
American
Chamber
Says,
BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Sept.
2,
2014,
available
at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09092/u-s-companies-say-china-subjectively-enforcinglaws.html.
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cases, rulings, and investigative activities that highlight China’s growing focus on
the erection and maintenance of barriers to entry and the employment of
exclusionary practices by perceived dominant firms (Pt. II. D.). Part III addresses
the ongoing criticisms of China’s AML enforcement activities by Western
governmental and business entities, and whether they are merited or likely to
catalyze material changes in China’s AML activities.

II. Current Major Emerging Trends in China’s AML Enforcement
Efforts
To understand China’s AML and its recent enforcement efforts, it is “necessary
and crucial not only to carefully examine the words of the AML, but to read them in
the context and light of Chinese history, culture, and traditions.”37 First and
foremost, we must recognize that China may be “the only civilization the world has
known upon which Western thought exercised little or no influence until modern
times.”38 “China’s historical culture was largely independent of Western influences
and its responses to its peoples’ economic needs are often peculiar to China and
sharply differentiated from other countries.”39
Second, it is important to keep in mind that China’s political system does not
share “the same values of the Western legal traditions.”40 China is not in any sense
“a western-style democracy,”41 and, “in reality, the country still is without rule of
law.”42 Furthermore, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including
its President Xi Jinping, are not interested in “bring[ing] about a change of

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Thomas J. Horton & Jenny Xiaojin Huang, Analyzing Information Exchanges between Competitors
under the Anti-Monopoly Law, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, 95, 98
(Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass, eds., 2013); See also, Pate, supra note 14, at 211 (“Whether we
like it or not, Chinese antitrust is going to be different from the U.S. and European varieties. Close
attention to the underlying conditions and attitudes that will drive Chinese enforcement will yield
more insight than comparing the AML with that of the U.S. and European statutes and court
decisions”); Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market
Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L. 643, 720 (2010) (“…the mold of Western antitrust
laws takes place under local conditions that are not entirely compatible with Western antitrust
models…despite having a Western-style antitrust law, China has not developed and likely will not
develop Western-style antitrust jurisprudence in the near future due to these local conditions”).
NORMAN KOTKER & CHARLES PATRICK FITZGERALD, THE HORIZON HISTORY OF CHINA 10 (Norman
Kotker, ed., 1969); See also Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 197.
Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 197, citing KOTKER & FITZGERALD, supra note
38, at 11.
Ignazio Castelluci, Rule of Law With Chinese Characteristics, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L L. & COMP. L. 35,
64 (2007). See also Horton & Huang, supra note 37, at 98.
See Horton, Confucianism & Antitrust, supra note 5, at 197.
Velk, Gong & Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 8. The authors add: “China does not have an
independent judiciary that acts as a check on executive power . . . Constitutionally prescribed limits
on the sovereign power of the Communist party are mere rhetorical devices.”
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allegiance by bringing Western political systems to China.”43 Indeed, one of the
CCP’s conspicuous slogans is “A strong Communist Party means happiness to the
Chinese people.”44 CCP Document No. 9 warns Chinese leaders that one of the goals
of the West “is to obscure the essential differences between the West’s value system
and the value system we advocate, ultimately using the West’s value systems to
supplant the core values of Socialism.”45
A key concern of the CCP is “to maintain social stability, which ensures the CCP
stays in power.”46 As an authoritarian single-party regime, the CCP believes it must
“reinforce [its] management of all types and levels of propaganda on the cultural
front, perfect and carry out related administrative systems, and allow absolutely no
opportunity or outlets for incorrect thinking or viewpoints to spread.”47 In simple
terms, China’s AML and the authorities that interpret and enforce it ultimately are
beholden to the CCP and its “Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation” through the continuing development and implementation of “socialism with
Therefore, China’s AML enforcement activities
Chinese characteristics.”48
ultimately are not directed towards carrying out or reinforcing western neoclassical
economic ideologies, but towards helping “to perfect a Socialist rule of law system
with Chinese characteristics.”49
A. China Aspires To Protect Its Socialist Market Economy By
Safeguarding What It Perceives to Be “Fair Market Competition”
And The “Consumer and Public Interests” Of Its Citizens
In Article 1 of Chapter 1, China’s AML sets out its broad goals of “preventing and
prohibiting monopolistic conduct, safeguarding fair market competition, improving
the efficiency of economic operation, protecting the consumer and public interests,
and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy.”50 Article

43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 3.
Xuecan, supra note 32.
Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 3.
Monthly Analysis of U.S. – China Trade Data, Report by the U.S. – China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Nov. 4, 2014, at 5. The USCC Report further characterizes the CCP as
“remain[ing] above the law.” Id. See also The Right Honourable Brian Mulroacy, The Growth of a
Giant, 60(1) ANTITRUST BULL. 14, 16 (2015) (arguing that in China there is no “serious consideration
of whether China should be open to options beyond a single-party control vehicle or, indeed, whether
more clarity needs to be brought to such fundamental issues as whether the party is (according to
most current interpretations) above the law or subject to it”).
Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at p. 7. See also Monthly Analysis, supra note 40, at 5 (“The government
is well aware of the need to maintain the public’s trust in the system”).
Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 2. Indeed, the CPC has gone so far as to pronounce that Chinese
television should be dedicated to promoting “socialist core values.” OSNOS, supra note 26, at 320.
See President Xi’s Plenum Speech Emphasizes the Law, CHINESE MEDIA DIG., Nov. 10, 2014, at 2.
AML Ch. 1, Art. 1. See note 11
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4 adds that “The State shall formulate and implement competition rules compatible
with the socialist market economy, perfect macroeconomic supervision, and develop
a united, open, competitive and orderly market system.”51
From the outset, China’s AML is ambiguous, and includes both industrial and
competition policies.52 As noted by distinguished Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law
Professor Xiaoye Wang, “[b]ecause consumer interests and the public interest may
not be parallel, it may still be difficult for the anti-monopoly authority to make a
choice.”53 What is not ambiguous, however, is the CCP’s determination that the
public interest “is a critical part of the law,”54 and that China’s AML is seen as part
of the State’s control over an orderly market system designed to promote the healthy
development of China’s socialist market economy, and “the universal good of the
Chinese people.”55
As China moves forward into its eighth year of AML enforcement, it is becoming
clear that China has not accepted western competition policy as a normative
organizing principle.56 Current United States Federal Trade Commissioner
Maureen K. Ohlhausen believes that in spite of the rhetoric about China wanting to
move “away from a planned economy and toward a market system,” there is still a
strong “continuing impulse to factor in effects on Chinese industry and employment
rather than focusing simply on efficiency and consumer welfare, as well as ongoing
support for more direct government intervention in the market.”57 Such interests
are seen as important in “building a harmonious socialist society,” and in promoting
“the prosperity of the nation, and the vitality and happiness of the Chinese people.”58
All this points to China’s emerging intent to be “guided by social, moral, and

51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
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AML Ch. I, Art. 4. See also Susan Beth Farmer The Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other
Competition Policies on U.S. Companies, 23 LOY. CONS. L. REV. 34, 42-43, 45 (2010) (discussing how
“AML Articles 1 and 4 diverge from the traditional model of antitrust analysis that is based solely
on competition principles”).
See e.g. WANG, supra note 13, at 322-23.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies on U.S. Companies: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 7 (July 13, 2010) (testimony of Shankar A. Singham); See also Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
Illuminating the Story of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (Oct. 2013) available
at: www.antitrustsource.com (observing that during a July 31-August 1, 2013, celebration of the
fifth anniversary of China’s AML, Chinese “antitrust officials were more mixed in their
endorsement of free-market competition, with several officials emphasizing the need for
maintaining regular market order”).
Ohlhausen, supra note 35, at 8. See also Farmer, supra note 52, at 45 (discussing how the AML
allows consideration of effects on “social public interests and economic development”).
WANG, supra note 13, at 21, quoting CCP’s Central Committee’s October 11, 2006, Decisions
Regarding Several Major Issues With Building a Harmonious Society.
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ethical considerations” in interpreting and enforcing its AML.59 A key objective
includes “preserving and protecting China’s traditional cultural and historical
values,”60 including Chinese Confucianism.61 China is determined to regulate
competitive behavior it deems to be ethically and socially irresponsible.62 China is
therefore focused on maintaining fair and orderly competition, which “assumes a
harmonious business relationship between competitors, as well as suppliers,
customers, and partners.”63 We should not therefore be surprised to see an emphasis
on encouraging fair competition, preventing unfair competition practices, and
protecting the legal rights and interests of business operators, as well as Chinese
consumers.64
Recent Chinese administrative rulings and guidelines, as well as court decisions,
point in this direction. For example, on August 23, 2014, China’s State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC),65 issued the Interim Regulation
on the Disclosure of Enterprise Information, which took effect on October 1, 2014.
SAIC’s Guidelines emphasize that enterprise information disclosure is designed to
ensure fair market competition, and to promote integrity and self-discipline among

59.
60.
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.

Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 196.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 205; see also JACQUES, supra note 16, at 565 (“The [Chinese] state remains as pivotal in society
and sacrosanct as it was in imperial times. Confucius, its great architect, is in the process of
experiencing a revival and his precepts still, in important measure, inform the way China thinks
and behaves. Although there are important differences between the Confucian and Communist
eras, there are also strong similarities”).
See e.g., Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 209; William E. Shafer, Kyoko
Fukukawa & Grace Meina Lee, Values and the Perceived Importance of Ethics and Social
Responsibility: The U.S. Versus China, 70 J. BUS. ETHICS 265, 268 (2007) (discussing how many
Chinese fear that “the transition to a market-based economy has been characterized by behavior
that is less than ethical and socially irresponsible”); SPENCE, supra note 22, at 699 (1990)
(discussing China’s longstanding fear of decadent Western influences, including “spiritual
pollution”).
Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 214. See also Lei Wang & Heikki Juslin, The
Impact of Chinese Culture on Corporate Social Responsibility: The Harmony Approach, 88 J. BUS.
ETHICS 433, 443-44 (2009).
See e.g., Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 217.
China’s SAIC “is a ministerial-level entity, directly under the State Council, charged with
supervision and regulation of the markets and protecting the rights of businesses and consumers.
It has responsibility for administering numerous commercial regulations, ranging from business
and trademark registration, consumer protection, and trademark registration, to street market
regulation.” HARRIS, ET AL., supra note 12, at 273. SAIC is responsible for “handling anticompetitive
conduct that has a major national impact or other monopolistic practices that it may find within its
jurisdiction.” Id. at 274. See also Yang Jie, SAIC’s Antitrust Enforcement Practice: The Progress
Made in the Past Five Years, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at 377 (SAIC “is
responsible for antitrust enforcement that is not related to anti-competitive pricing practices and
merger control. In particular, it is responsible for enforcement against monopoly agreements,
abuses of a dominant market position and abuses of administrative powers to eliminate or restrict
competition”); WANG, supra note 13, at 408-9 (discussing “antitrust enforcement by SAIC”).
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market participants, while also expending “social supervision.”66 Terms such as
“guarantee[ing] fair competition” and “promot[ing] the integrity and self discipline
of enterprises” highlight China’s focus on social, moral, and ethical considerations in
market competition.67
Similar terms have been employed in recent anti-monopoly investigations and
announcements by China’s National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC).68 For example, on September 26, 2014, the NDRC announced an
administrative monopoly investigation of the Hebei Provincial Government’s
Transport Department, Price Bureau, and Finance Department.69 The NDRC
struck down a preferential toll policy that favored Hebei transport businesses over
their out-of-province competitors. The NDRC “found that the policy harmed fair
competition and constituted an abuse of administrative power in breach of Article 8
of the AML.”70 Thus, the NDRC sent a strong message that local governmental
officials should work to ensure fair competition and an orderly market within their
borders.71
Similarly, China’s courts have recently focused on “unfair competition” issues.
For example, on September 22, 2014, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court
ruled that Kingsoft, a Chinese internet company, had engaged in unfair competition
by using an advertisement filter to block the video ads of Youku, one of China’s
largest online video-sharing companies.72 The Court’s ruling is consistent with

66.

67.

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.
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Interim Regulation on Enterprise Information Disclosure (promulgated by the State Council, Aug.
7, 2014, effective Oct. 1, 2014) (P.R.C.)). Article 1, for example, states: “This Regulation is
formulated to guarantee fair competition, promote the integrity and self-discipline enterprises,
regulate enterprise information disclosure, intensify enterprise credit restraint, maintain
transaction safety, improve the effectiveness of government regulation, and expand social
supervision.” Id. at Art. 1.
Similarly, China’s government procurement system is to be based on the “principles of openness
and transparency, fair competition, impartiality, and good faith.” CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1
(25th ed. 2013); China’s Rules on Retailing Fees were promulgated “for the purpose of maintaining
market order and fair trading and promoting the healthy development of the retail industry.” CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 2 (17th ed. 2012).
China’s NDRC “is a ministerial-level entity directly under the State Council. It is charged with the
formulation and implementation of national economic and development policies.” The NDRC “also
enforces [China’s] Price Law, which prohibits certain ‘unfair pricing behaviors,’ including pricefixing, predatory pricing, price discrimination, and deceptive pricing.” HARRIS, ET AL., supra note
12, at 277. See also WANG, supra note 13, at 407-08 (discussing “antitrust enforcement by the
NDRC”).
NDRC Investigates Administrative Monopoly in Hebei Province, in CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3
(34th
ed.
2014),
NDRC
opinion
available
at
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201409/t20140926_626773.html.
Id.
“Reports indicate[d] that the NDRC investigation was initiated in response to a complaint by the
South Korean embassy, which passed on a complaint by a Chinese-Korean company in Tianjin who
was unable to take advantage of the [toll] discount[s].” Id.
Beijing Court Rules Against Kingsoft in Unfair Competition Case, in CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 5
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China’s Internet Information Service Rules, which prohibit Internet information
services from engaging in conduct that may damage the legal rights of their
competitors and consumers.73
China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) also repeatedly and consistently has
emphasized that intellectual property and patents must be licensed on “fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms” in allowing various mergers and
acquisitions to proceed. For example, in its 2012 conditional approval of Google’s
acquisition of Motorola Mobility, MOFCOM required that “Google must honor
Motorola Mobility’s existing commitment to license its patents on fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory terms.”74 Similarly, in Microsoft’s 2014 acquisition of
Nokia’s devices and services business, MOFCOM required Microsoft to make
various licenses committed to industry standards available on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory terms (“FRAND”); and to offer fair royalty rates and conditions
for patents not committed to any industry standard.75
MOFCOM has employed similar remedies requiring fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory behavior in supplying various products to Chinese businesses postmerger. For example, in the 2013 Glencore/Xstrata merger, MOFCOM imposed
requirements that for a period of eight years, Glencore has to supply certain volumes
of copper, zinc and lead concentrates to Chinese customers with prices and other
conditions that are fair, reasonable, and consistent with the then prevailing terms
used in the international market.76 Likewise, in the General Motors/Delphi

73.

74.
75.

76.

(34th
ed.
2014);
opinion
available
at
http://bj1zy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/09/id/1449430.shtml.
See e.g. CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1 (12th ed. 2011) (“The draft Internet Information Services
Rules contain 22 articles and prohibit Internet information services from engaging in conduct that
may damage the legal rights of their competitors and consumers.”); CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1
(8th ed. 2011) (discussing how China’s Service Codes for E-Commerce Third Party Transaction
Platforms forbid “imped[ing] the legitimate interests of other business operators and consumers”).
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4-5 (20th ed. 2012).
CHINA
COMPETITION
BULL.
3-4
(31st
ed.
2014);
and
http://fidj/mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201404/20140400542415.shtml;
and
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/slfw/201404/2014040054254.shtml. It is especially interesting
to note that MOFCOM required such conditions after the deal was unconditionally approved by a
number of leading international enforcement authorities, including those of the United States and
the European Union. Id. MOFCOM has been the only major competition authority to impose
restrictive conditions in a number of other deals that have been approved unconditionally by
authorities in the United States, Europe and Japan, including: Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite
International (MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 28, April 24, 2009); General Motors/Delphi (MOFCOM
Publ. Ann. No. 76, Sept. 28, 2009); Seagate/Samsung (MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 90, Dec. 12, 2011);
and Google/Motorola Mobility (MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 25, May 19, 2012). See HARRIS, ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 38. Furthermore, MOFCOM has not been afraid to impose “remedies that were
different to or went beyond those required by other jurisdictions,” for example in the
InBev/Anheuser Busch [MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 95, Nov. 18, 2008] and Western Digital/Hitachi
transactions. Id. at 38-39.
Merger Update—MOFCOM Approval and Management Update, Glencore International p/c News
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Corporation merger in 2009, MOFCOM required that GM would “continue with its
principle of multiple sourcing and nondiscrimination with respect to all auto parts,
and to conduct nondiscriminatory procurement…, and not to specially formulate any
unreasonable conditions favorable toward Delphi but unfavorable toward other
suppliers.”77
Taken together, these rulings and statements confirm China’s belief that fair
market competition at all levels is crucial to “protecting the consumer and public
interests, [and] promoting the healthy development of the socialist market
economy.”78 Such judicial and administrative rulings and statements are consistent
with and advance the CCP’s own pronouncements that “fairness and justice” are
crucial keys to a successful socialist economy and country.79 It is important to keep
in mind that “Confucian morality traditionally has decried selfishness and greed ‘as
an antisocial evil.’”80 Fears and concerns with “the social evils of unbridled
capitalism and extreme individualism in the West”81 are therefore likely to continue
the push for implementing antitrust policies “that ensure all market participants
have a level competitive field.”82
One substantive area in which China’s focus on fairness appears to be leading to
dramatic substantive differences is in resale price maintenance (RPM). In contrast
to antitrust enforcers in the United States, China’s AML enforcement authorities
have paid special attention in the last several years to potential resale price
maintenance (RPM) policies and activities.83 For example, on February 23, 2013,
China’s NDRC “fined two Chinese state-owned liquor manufacturers through its

77.
78.
79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
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Release (April 16, 2013), at 2.
MOFCOM Announcement [2009] No. 76 (Sept. 28, 2009), at pt. 7.
AML Ch. I, Art. 1.
See e.g., The State Council Info. Office, China, China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the
Rule of Law, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L LAW (2008). The government listed “fairness and justice [as critical
to China’s future]”, as well as “safeguarding market order and achieving social fairness and justice
[in] establish[ing] an initial law regime for the socialist market economy.” Id. at 514, 517; see also
Chinese Scholars Debate Rule of Law and Economy, supra note 44, at 3 (observing that “a market
economy governed by law must fulfill three basic requirements: the law must command the highest
authority; uphold fundamental principles like fairness and justice, with protection of rights at its
core; and develop in harmony with the economy and society…[and] Chinese society must share the
values of a ‘market economy governed by law,’ including freedom, equality, fairness, and trust”).
Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 216, quoting FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra
note 16, at 258-59.
See SPENCE, supra note 22, at 17.
Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 216, quoting Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu,
Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms, 119 ECON. J.
764, 794 (2009).
See e.g. Shan Jiang & D. Daniel Sokol, Resale Price Maintenance in China: An Economic
Perspective, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming 2015), available at SSRN, at i138
(“Administrative enforcement of RPM has been a significant priority in recent years”); Dennis Lu
& Guofu Tan, Resale Price Maintenance and the Anti-Monopoly Law, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY
LAW, supra note 9, at 119.
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local authorities for restricting competition and harming consumers by using
minimum RPM in their distribution agreements.”84 Six months later, on August 7,
2013, NDRC fined Biostime and five other infant formula makers for enforcing RPM
in various forms, “including fixing the prices of commodities resold to a third party
or restricting the minimum prices for commodities resold to a third party….”85
More recently, NDRC enforcement investigations and fines have been targeted
towards major foreign eyeglass manufacturers,86 as well as foreign automobile
companies, including Mercedes Benz, Audi, Volkswagen, and Chrysler.87 For
example, on April 23, 2015, the Jiangsu Price Bureau (the NRDC’s local Jiangsu
Province counterpart) fined Mercedes Benz RMB 350 million and several of its local
dealers a total of RMB 7.9 million for implementing resale price maintenance
through checks, warnings, and penalties such as reducing policy support.88The
increasing crackdowns against RPM by foreign companies in China has led some
commentators to ask whether the NDRC considers RPM to be an essentially per se
violation.89 There is little doubt that RPM in China will continue to be a hot issue.
B. China Is Determined To Protect And Enhance Its Own Perceived
Long-Term Security and Economic Interests
China’s AML expressly sets forth China’s strong interest in protecting and
enhancing China’s national and economic security.90 Article 31 of the AML requires
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.

90.

Lu & Tan, supra note 83, at 127.
Jiang & Sokol, supra note 83, at 9.
See e.g. Jiang & Sokol, supra note 83, at 10, and NDRC Fines Lens Manufacturers for Vertical PriceFixing, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 6 (32nd ed. 2014). The NDRC imposed aggregate fines in excess
of RMB 19 million against a number of large foreign eyeglass and contact lens manufacturers,
including Essior, Nikon, Carl Zeiss, Johnson & Johnson, and Bausch & Lomb. Interestingly, two
key Chinese companies, Hoya and Shanghai Weicon Optical “were exempt from penalties as they
reported the anti-competitive conduct and provided important evidence to the NDRC.” Id.
See e.g. FAW-Volkswagen and Audi Dealers Fined in Hubei Province for Resale Price Maintenance
and Price Fixing, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 2 (34th ed. 2014); Shanghai Price Bureau Sanctions
Chrysler and Chrysler Dealers for Resale Price Maintenance and Price Fixing. Id. at 3.
See The NRDC imposed a find of RMB 350 million on Mercedes Benz and over RMB 7 million on
local
dealers,
CHINA
COMPETITION
BULL.
3
(36th
ed.
2015),
citing
http://www.jswjj.gov.cn/office_new/eo_comm_zxnrxs.php.
For example, a January 14, 2015, CLE webinar brochure advertised that: “Crackdowns are
increasing in China against alleged RPM practices by foreign and domestic companies. The
[NDRC]…appears to consider resale price maintenance to be a per se violation of the law.”
Strafford, Intensified Resale Price Maintenance Enforcement in China, the EU and the US:
Mitigating
Antitrust
Risk,
Jan.
14,
2015,
available
at
https://www.straffordpub.com/products/intensified-resale-price-maintenance....;
See
also
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Resale Price Maintenance: Is it ‘per se’ illegal in China?, Feb. 6,
2013 (copy of memorandum on file with author). But see Jiang & Sokol, supra note 83 (arguing that
China should pursue a “prohibition plus exemption” enforcement model that analyses economic and
competitive effects factors).
See e.g. Farmer, supra note 51, at 36-37 (“In another departure from American antitrust policy, the
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mergers or acquisitions involving foreign companies or investors “which implicate
national security” to “go through national security reviews according to relevant
laws and regulations.”91 AML Article 27 additionally requires China’s competition
authorities to review “the effect of [a] concentration on national economic
development,” as well as “[o]ther factors affecting market competition as determined
by the AMEA [Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities].”92
AML Articles 27 and 31 mesh with Article 1’s broad goals of “promoting the
healthy development of the socialist market economy” and AML Article 4’s
admonition that “[T]he State shall formulate and implement competition rules
compatible with the socialist market economy, perfect macroeconomic supervision
and control, and develop a united, open, competitive and orderly market system.”93
Together, these articles provide strong incentives to China’s AML authorities to
regulate business conduct that “would not only impede competition but also harm
Chinese national security [and economic interests].”94
These AML provisions further reflect long-standing Chinese concerns and
internal debates “regarding the perceived national security issues arising from
foreign acquisitions of domestic [Chinese] companies, with particular concern
focused on ‘strategic and sensitive’ industries and Chinese national champions.”95 It
is difficult for Westerners to fully appreciate China’s intense security concerns based
on the horrific and “long history of destructive imperialism in China, which has led
to ‘social disruption and psychological demoralization,’ and, at times, threatened
China’s ‘entire way of life.’”96 But such concerns remain powerful throughout China

91.
92.

93.
94.
95.

96.

124

Chinese antitrust law explicitly incorporates additional, non-competition factors into the
analysis…The agency guidelines and language of the available decisions employ mainstream
analytic concepts, but also may import non-economic factors such as ‘national economic
development’ and ‘national security’ in mergers involving foreign investors.”
AML Ch. IV, Art. 31.
AML Ch. IV, Art. 27. See also Ohlhausen, Illuminating, supra note 35, at 6 (discussing how AML
Article 27 expressly allows for consideration of broad factors that are inconsistent “with market
competition analysis . . . [including] the effect of the proposed deal on the development of the
national economy, and any other factors determined by the State Council Anti-Monopoly
Enforcement Authority”).
AML Ch. I, Art. 4.
WANG, supra note 13, at 320.
HARRIS ET. AL., supra note 12, at 134, quoting NDRC, Special Review Mechanism Needs to be
Established for Mergers and Acquisitions Involving Foreign Parties, Dec. 27, 2006. See also MARK
FURSE, ANTITRUST LAW IN CHINA, KOREA AND VIETNAM 107 (2009). In all fairness, it must be noted
that in the United States and Canada, serious concerns about China using investments in western
companies and technology for military and strategic purposes have led to increasing careful
monitoring and review in both countries of Chinese investments and acquisitions. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Raffin & Eric Wiebe, A Timeline of the East-West Relationship: Past, Present, and Future
Acquisitions, 60(1) ANTITRUST BULL. 19 (2015). Indeed, the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS) “applied mitigation measures to sixteen cases from 2008 to 2010.” Id.
at 28.
Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 199-200, citing FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra
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today. As recently noted by the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review
Commission in its November 2014 Report to Congress: “Published Chinese views
on China-Japan security relations encompass a mix of suspicion, alarm, and
concern—especially on the issues of Japan’s increasing robust defense and security
establishment, the development of the U.S.—Japan alliance, and perceived lack of
Japanese atonement over its wartime past.”97
Alarmingly, China has increasingly begun leveraging its economic successes into
a major military build-up. For example, the U.S.-China Economic Security Review
Commission (USCC) Report adds: “China is engaged in a sustained and substantial
military buildup that is shifting the balance of power in the region, and is using its
growing military advantages to support its drive for a dominant sphere of influence
in East Asia.”98 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has raised
particular concerns over China’s naval build-up, which has “served to crystallize the
doubts and fears about China’s long-term intentions.”99
Some commentators have sought to argue that China’s intense focus on protecting
its own economic security partially could be a result of “the national security hurdles
encountered by Chinese companies overseas….”100 Indeed, China appears to have
modelled its AML security provisions on United States’ regulations that were used
to block foreign purchases in the United States based “on purported national
security grounds.”101 In any event, it seems likely that security concerns on both

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

note 16, at 189. As described by Fairbank and Goldman, “[t]oday’s historians are more likely to
stress the social disruption and psychological demoralization caused by foreign imperialism. In
these dimensions the long-term foreign invasion[s] of China proved to be a disaster so
comprehensive and appalling that we are still incapable of fully describing it.” Id. See also RANA
MITTER, FORGOTTEN ALLY: CHINA’S WORLD WAR II – 1937-1945 (2013) (describing in detail the
horrors of Japanese atrocities in WWII); MICHAEL BURLEIGH, MORAL COMBAT: GOOD AND EVIL IN
WWII 14-21 (2011) (describing Japan’s horrific invasion of China and the barbaric slaughter and
torture of Chinese civilians and soldiers); IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN
HOLOCAUST OF WORLD WAR II (1997) (describing the horrors of Japan’s invasion of China during
World War II).
USCC 2014 Report to Congress, Competing Interests, supra note 35, at 21.
Id. at 22.
JACQUES, supra note 16, at 591. Jacques adds: “It would seem that the Chinese government made
little or no attempt to inform, let alone consult, its ASEAN partners about the new naval
deployments.” Id.
HARRIS, ET. AL., supra note 12, at 134.
Id. Indeed, AML Article 31 “was formulated after CNOOC’s proposed acquisition of Unocal in 2005
in the United States, which failed in the face of heavy opposition on national security and other
grounds.” Id. at 134, n. 36. See also Michael Petrusie, Recent Development Oil and the National
Security: CNOOC’s Failed Bid to Purchase UNOCAL, 84 N. CAR. L. REV. 1373 (2006). Professor
Xiaoye Wang perceptively adds that China’s AML security provision “is not unlike the United
States, United States’ Exon-Florio merger review of certain foreign investments involving national
security.” WANG, supra note 13, at 320-21, citing 50 U.S.C.A §2170. See also Moritz Lorentz, The
New Chinese Competition Act, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 257, 261 (2008); Nathan Bush & Zhou
Zhaofeng, Chinese Antitrust—Act II, Scene I, 8(1) THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 9 (2008); Raffin &
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sides will increasingly impact economic relations between China and the west.102
A potential complicating factor in attempting to predict how boldly China will
apply security concerns in its interpretation and enforcement of its AML is that the
term “national security” conceivably could be defined broadly and “used to promote
Indeed, MOFCOM’s 2011
domestic [Chinese] economic protectionism.”103
implementing regulations broadly cover military or military-related enterprises
surrounding a key or sensitive military infrastructure or unit otherwise related to
the military; and national security-related enterprises regarding important
agricultural and energy products and resources, as well as important infrastructure,
transportation, technology and major equipment manufacturing.104 Potential
factors to be considered include the influence of potential transactions over China’s
national defense, the stable running of China’s economy, China’s basic social life and
order, and research and development of key national security technologies.105 The
potential practical breadth of these national security concerns is enormous, and
highlights China’s obsession with protecting its national security interests against
foreign investments. Therefore, it is likely that national security concerns will play
a crucial role in China’s AML review of the activities of foreign companies and
investors in China in the coming years.
Furthermore, as discussed above, China’s AML specifically identifies the
protecting of “the public interest and the impact on the Chinese national economy”
as key goals and objectives.106 Once again, such considerations in the context of
industrial conduct and transactions, including mergers and acquisitions, “is a very

102.
103.

104.

105.
106.
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Wiebe, supra note 96, at 35-37 (discussing increasing American and Canadian hostility to Chinese
investments that could confer strategic military advantages).
See, e.g., CAPITOL FORUM, May 12, 2015, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: An Interview with Professor
Tom Horton of USD Law (on file with author).
Competition Policy in China, Report by the U.S.—China Business Council, Sept. 2014, at 13. See
also Hannah C. L. Ho, China’s Security Review System for Foreign Investment: Where Do We
Stand?, MONDAQ (April 7, 2014) (discussing the possibility of overbroad interpretations of sensitive
or key competitive areas); Christine Kahler, Foreign M & A in China Face Security Review, CHINA
BUS. REV. (April 1, 2011) (observing that “the security review will analyze the M & A deal’s effects
on national security, China’s economy, social stability, and the R & D capabilities of key national
security technologies. Transactions found to have ‘significant effects on national security’ will be
terminated or approved conditionally”).
MOFCOM Regulation on Implementing the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, of September 1, 2011. See also McDermott, Will &
Emery, China Formalises National Security Review System for M & A Transactions by Foreign
Firms, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/china-formalises-national-securityreview-system-ma-transactions-foreign-investors. See also JANE M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW
DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN INVESTED BUSINESSES 930, n. 114 (3d ed. 2010).
Id.
Gregory K. Leonard & Yizhe Zhang, Considering the Unique Aspects of the Merger Review Process
in China, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 1 (2014). See also AML, Ch. I, Arts. 1 & 4.
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broad concept.”107 Combined with the “insufficient independence” for antitrust
enforcement authorities in China,108 such broad economic policy goals for antitrust
create potential vulnerabilities for “officials at MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC, [who]
are part of larger organizations whose functions include the formulation and
implementation of macroeconomic and other policies.”109
There should be little doubt that broad macroeconomic concerns are given priority
over competition concerns in China today. For example, in 2014, China’s “Party
leaders placed their highest priority on maintaining public support through rapid
economic growth and job creation.”110 As a result, some commentators argue that
“[d]uring the course of 2014, foreign companies investing in China faced increased
regulatory burdens and barriers to business dealings that do not similarly encumber
China’s highly favored ‘national champions.’”111 Throughout 2014, “China used [its]
AML to investigate foreign firms in sectors designated by the government as
‘strategic and emerging,’ including automobiles and information technology.”112
Such developments reveal a continuing intention to heavily factor in perceived
effects on Chinese industry and employment.
China’s President Xi Jinping announced at China’s 2013 Third Plenum that
reforms were important, but the state would continue to play a key role in the
economy.113 Such pronouncements are more than rhetoric. CCP Document No. 9
confirms that such speeches are designed to “unif[y] the thought of the entire Party,
the entire country, and the people enormously.”114 Combined with the CCP’s
promises to “accelerate[e] economic transformation as the main thread, and
increas[e] the quality and efficiency of the economy at its core,”115 it is likely that
protecting and enhancing China’s perceived long-term security and economic
interests will play a key role in China’s future interpretation and enforcement of its

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

114.
115.

Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Five Years of Implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law—
Achievements and Challenges, 2013 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 1, 23 (2013).
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
U.S.—CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 46, at 33.
Id. at 34. Furthermore, “[f]or the first time, in 2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) from China
into the United States exceeded FDI from the United States to China.” Id.
U.S. –CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW, supra note 40, at 60. The European Union
Chamber of Commerce has emphasized similar concerns. See Michael Martina, EU Lobby Piles in
on Foreign Criticism of China’s Antitrust Enforcement, REUTERS, Sept. 9, 2014.
China’s Third Plenum: Xi Jinping consolidates Power, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 12, 2013, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1044176/Chinas-Third-Plenum. (“The free
market, [the conference statement] said, would be given a ‘decisive role in allocating resources,’ but
the Communist party will continue to shape the economic landscape”).
Doc. No. 9, supra note 18, at 2.
Id.
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AML.116 As observed by AML scholar Wendy Ng, “[w]here an important or sensitive
Chinese industry is involved, it appears that MOFCOM might be more concerned
about the potential negative effects of the transaction on the industry and national
economic development more generally.”117
C. China Is Further Focused On Protecting Its Indigenous
Businesses and Entrepreneurs, Including Its Diverse Multitude Of
Small And Medium-Sized Businesses
Although China’s economy is plagued today by the continuing existence of StateOwned Enterprises (SOEs),118 China has a strong backbone of small and mediumsize businesses, sometimes referred to as “a fast-growing thicket of bamboo
capitalism.”119 This “astonishing force” of private entrepreneurs is a crucial
contributor to economic innovation and growth in China.120 Not surprisingly, “China
continues to show a keen interest in protecting the long-term health and economic
opportunities of [these] smaller competitors.”121 Encouraging small businesses and
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117.
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Id. at 46. Brookings Institution scholar Arthur Kroeber adds that “[t]he respective roles of state
and market need to be clarified, but the state role will remain very large.” Arthur Kroeber, After
the NPC: Xi Jinping’s Roadmap for China, (Brookings Instit.), March 11, 2014, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/11-after-npc-xi-jinping-roadmap-for-chinakroeber. Moreover, the IMF observed in a 2014 report on China that its economic reform blueprint
“has not been followed up with details on the specific reforms or timetables.” Id.
Wendy Ng, Policy Objectives of Public Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law: The First Five Years,
in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at 35, 44. Interestingly, “the involvement of a wellknown Chinese brand appears to be an [additional potential] important factor in MOFCOM’s
decision-making.” Id. at 45. See also Wang & Emch, supra note 107, at 22 (“An important weakness
of the three antitrust authorities is that they are inserted within larger ministries or commissions
under the State Council. In other words, their level in the Chinese hierarchy is not high enough for
enforcing the AML in an entirely independent and ‘neutral’ manner”).
A wealth of excellent scholarship discussing economic issues relating to China’s SOEs is available.
For example, Professor Xiaoye Wang observes: “State-owned enterprises face the biggest problems
in China’s current economic reforms…Currently, the key to China’s economic reform is the reform
of state-owned enterprises, and promoting competition and breaking up monopolies are the keys to
turning the state-owned enterprises into legal person.” WANG, supra note 10, at 151. See also id.
at 138-39 (“Based on primarily historical and structural reasons, China should concentrate its
current anti-monopoly effects on state-owned enterprises”); Thomas Brook, China’s Anti-Monopoly
Law: History, Application, and Enforcement, 16 APPEAL 31, 38 (2011) (“SOEs have retained
significant if not strengthened control of many industries despite attempts by the Chinese
government to introduce competition”). A fuller discussion of China’s SOEs and ongoing reform
efforts by China is beyond the scope of this article.
Wesley Harris, China Energy: A Crossroads Historiography, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 255, 259
(2012), quoting China’s Economy:
Bamboo Capitalism, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18332610.
Id. at 258-59. See also JACQUES, supra note 16, at 621 (arguing that “a major reason why the
Chinese economy has been so dynamic is the intense competition between the various provinces
and their firms”).
Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at 225. See also Thomas J. Horton & Jenny
Xiaojin Huang, Analyzing Information Exchanges between Competitors un the Anti-Monopoly Law,
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entrepreneurs is viewed as a key part of China’s efforts to promote “the healthy
development of the socialist market economy.”122
China sees the protection of small and medium-size competitors and producers in
a competitive market as beneficial in several key ways.123 First, their continuing
presence “allows local producers to participate in an evolving and innovative market,
thereby increasing the possibility of capturing technological expansions.”124 They
also help fuel China’s economic growth and promote its long-term economic
stability.125
China’s AML unapologetically sets forth China’s interest in protecting its small
businesses’ competitive opportunities. For example, AML Article 15 (3) sets forth
the express objective of “improving operational efficiency and enhancing the
competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises.”126 AML Articles 1 and 4
bolster and buttress this clear objective by seeking to “safeguard[ ] fair market
competition” and by “develop[ing] a united, open, competitive and orderly market
system.”127 Similarly, Article 6 forbids dominant undertakings from abusing their
market positions “to eliminate or restrict competition.”128 Such provisions have led
some scholars to raise the “worrisome possibility” that “the drafters intended the
AML as a tool to promote [China’s] domestic economy….”129
In interpreting and carrying out these mandates, China’s AML regulators
unapologetically have sought to limit activities or transactions that could have an
adverse impact on domestic small and medium-size businesses. For example, at a

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

129.

in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, supra note 9, at 101 (discussing China’s interest in “protecting
the long-term health and stability of smaller competitors, as part of its interest in an orderly market
and ‘industry self-discipline’”).
See e.g. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 408. Former Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping, for
example, saw government encouragement of small and medium-size businesses as part of a
program of economic reforms called “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Id.
See Jared A. Berry, Anti-Monopoly Law in China: A Socialist Market Economy Wrestles with Its
Antitrust Regime, 2 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 129, 144 (2005).
Id.
See Id.
AML Ch. II, Art. 15 (3).
AML Ch. II, Arts. 1 & 4.
AML Ch. I, Art. 6. See also AML Ch. IV, Arts. 27-28. Article 27 states that the effect of economic
concentrations on “consumers and other undertakings” must be considered in “the review of
concentrations.” Other undertakings can be interpreted to include both competitors and customers.
Article 28 adds that “where a concentration of undertakings results in or may result in the effect of
eliminating or restricting competition, the AMEA shall make a decision to prohibit the
concentration.” This stern and mandatory language suggests a strong interest in protecting small
and medium-sized competitors.
Oliver Q. C. Zhong, Dawn of a New Constitutional Era or Opportunity Wasted? An Intellectual
Reappraisal of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 24 COL. J. ASIAN L. 87, 106 (2010); See also Competition
Policy and Enforcement in China, U.S.—China Bus. Council (Sept. 2014), at 12 (“Many questions
remain unanswered about the objectives of China’s competition regime. Among them: Will China
use the AML to protect domestic industry rather than promote fair competition?”).

129

14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (2016)

May 2014 Conference in Beijing co-sponsored by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law
and the Expert Advisory Committee of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Shang Ming, the Director General
of MOFCOM’s Anti-Monopoly Bureau, admitted that “MOFCOM seeks comments
from industrial regulators in its merger review practices and will continue to do
so.”130 Director Ming further stated that “MOFCOM will continue to balance
competition policies and industrial policies in its merger review.”131
An early well-known example of MOFCOM’s interest in protecting small and
medium-size Chinese businesses is MOFCOM’s 2009 decision to block Coca-Cola’s
proposed acquisition of Huiyan, a Chinese juice producer.132 In its Public
Announcement, MOFCOM indicated that it looked at several important factors
under AML Art. 27, including “[t]he effect of the concentration on the development
of the national economy.”133 MOFCOM concluded that “[t]he transaction would have
an adverse impact on domestic small-and medium-sized enterprises in the fruit juice
market and impair their ability to compete and innovate, negatively affecting the
sound development of the Chinese juice industry.”134
More recent MOFCOM decisions have shown a continuing concern for protecting
and enhancing competitive opportunities for Chinese firms. For example, in
conditionally approving Merck’s acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials on April 30,
2014, MOFCOM imposed licensing and behavioral remedies due to its concern that
competitors could face unfair bundling and cross-subsidization competition that
could “result in the marginalization or exit of competitors from the market.”135
Similarly, on June 17, 2004, MOFCOM prohibited the formation of the proposed P3
Network shipping alliance between Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA
GGM in part because the network could “suppress competitors’ room for
development, increase the parties’ bargaining power vis-a’-vis ports, and harm the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Client Memorandum from Davis Polk Law Firm 2 (June 5, 2014) (on file with author).
Id. at 3. The Director added that “[i]ndustrial regulators know their respective industries well and
their comments often include information on industrial development trends, which helps MOFCOM
identify competition problems and solve competition concerns.” Id. at 2-3.
Coca-Cola/Huiyan, MOFCOM Publ. Ann. No. 22, March 18, 2009.
Id. at 2(5).
Wang and Emch, supra note 108, at 9. In section 4(3) of its Public Announcement, MOFCOM
explained:
The concentration would squeeze out small and medium-sized juice producers in China,
and restrain local producers from participating in competition in the juice beverage market
and their ability for proprietary innovation, which would have a negative effect over
effective competition in the Chinese juice beverage market, and would prove adverse to the
sustained sound development of the juice beverage market in China.
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MOFCOM Publ. Ann. 22, supra note 132, at 4(3).
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. (32nd ed. 2014), at 3; citing http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/
201404/20140400569060.shtml.
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interest of cargo owners.”136 More recently, MOFCOM played a potentially decisive
role in catalyzing American and Japanese semiconductor and display industry
giants Applied Materials and Tokyo Electron to abandon their proposed merger.
MOFCOM believed that the proposed merger would have “a severe impact on the
interests of Chinese chip manufacturing customers.”137
Watching MOFCOM’s increasingly aggressive enforcement efforts unfold, it
seems fair to predict that China will continue focusing, at least in the near term, on
protecting its diverse multitude of small and medium-sized businesses, as well as
national champions and core Chinese competitors in strategic businesses.138
D. China Has Shown A Strong Propensity To Focus on Potential
Barriers To Entry And The Use of Exclusionary Practices by
Dominant Firms
“[H]aving co-opted Western capitalism and mirrored many of its surface features,
China today poses an unprecedented and profound challenge to Western capitalism
that scholars and policymakers have only begun to grasp.”139 As previously
discussed, divergent views about antitrust enforcement and different regulatory
focuses “may arise from the unique and economic-specific national policies each
country’s antitrust laws are designed to promote.”140 Consequently, “culturally
embedded” competition laws, despite similarities in wordings, “may mean different
things in different societies.”141 We should not therefore be surprised that Chinese
Anti-Monopoly Law regulators are taking “into account specific social and economic
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138.
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141.

CHINA COMPETITION BULL. (32nd ed. 2014), at 4, citing http://fldgj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/
201406/20140600628586.html. Interestingly, both the United States and European authorities had
previously determined “that the alliance would not result in unreasonable increases in
transportation costs through a reduction in competition.” Id. at 5. Unlike MOFCOM, “both took
into account the parties’ argument that the alliance would result in operational efficiencies and
benefit consumers.” Id.
See CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4 (36th ed. 2015), citing http://www/mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/
ail201504/2015040095517.shtml; Interview with Tom Horton, Professor of Law at Univ. of S.D.,
supra n. 102, at 3-6 (discussing the various strategic considerations of the proposed deal from the
perspectives of the United States, Japan, and China).
See Lawrence S. Liu, All About Fair Trade? – Competitors Law in Taiwan and East Asian Economic
Development, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 298 (2012) (arguing that China “resorts to serious industrial
policy to foster national champions in strategic sectors….”); see also Berry, supra note 123, at 152
(predicting that China’s AML enforcement “will likely reflect the CCP’s historically protectionist
tendencies….”); Deborah Healey, Anti-Monopoly Law and Mergers in China: An Early Report Card
on Procedural and Substantive Issues, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 17, 26 (2010) (arguing that
China’s “policy of promoting mergers and acquisitions to form large companies which will be
internationally competitive, thereby creating national champions, is inconsistent with competition
law principles”).
Marshall W. Meyer, Is it Capitalism?, 7 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 5, 8 (2010).
Farmer, Impact of China’s Antitrust Law, supra note 51, at 41.
Liu, supra note 138, at 269.
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circumstances in China, rather than uncritically importing the legislative models
used in the U.S. and the E.U.”142
The Chinese do not appear to be buying into the current extreme American
judicial tolerance and even encouragement of concentrated industries143 and
predatory conduct, as allegedly “important element[s] in the free market system.”144
Instead, the Chinese are showing an increased interest in controlling and arresting
the growth of monopolies and dominant firms. China’s current interest parallels an
ongoing trend in China towards economic decentralization.145 As previously
discussed, many of China’s industries, “are characterized by small-scale firms and
low market concentration ratios.”146 Throughout “China’s bustling cities, vast
numbers of small businesses exist alongside the towers of industrial and corporate
giants.”147
Chapter III of China’s AML covers “Abuse of Dominant Market Position.”148
Recent Chinese AML investigations show an emphasis on enforcing Chapter III.
The focus seems to be on lowering potential barriers to entry for Chinese firms and
controlling the use of potential exclusionary practices by dominant firms.149
142.
143.

144.

145.
146.

147.
148.
149.
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Dr. Yijun Tian, The Impacts of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law on IP Commercialization in China
& General Strategies for Technology-Driven Companies and Future Regulators, 2010 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 004, ¶ 55 (2010).
See e.g. Sam Peltzman, Industrial Concentration Under the Rule of Reason, 57 J. L. & ECON. S101
(2014) (finding that concentration for American manufacturing has increased since 1982, due
largely to the relaxation of antitrust merger standards); Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra
note 5, at 224 (discussing the trend of growing economic consolidation in the United States);
WALTER A. ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2d ed. 2004); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE
OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 100 (2005) (discussing the rapidly
accelerating trend to concentration); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, MEGA MERGERS: CORPORATE
AMERICA’S BILLION-DOLLAR TAKEOVERS (2003).
Rudolph J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: 1888-1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 239
(1996) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 28 (2d ed. 2001). See also Verizon Commc’ns,
Inv. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the
Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix. Applying Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and
Revive Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 615, 616 (2012); Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust
Goals, supra note 2, at 555-557 (discussing how antitrust in the United States is no longer
interested in “arresting economic power in its incipiency”).
See e.g. Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China, supra note 37, at 656; Yingyi Qian & Chenggang
Xu, Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the
Non-State Sector, 1 ECON. TRANSITION 135, 145-47 (1993).
Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China, supra note 37, at 710. Zheng adds that “[o]fficial statistics
indicate that market concentration ratios in China have been unusually low when compared to both
developed and developing countries.” Id.; see Horton, Confucianism and Antitrust, supra note 5, at
224-26.
Id. at 224.
AML Ch. III.
AML Article 17 defines a “dominant market position” as one that “enables the undertakings to
control the price or quantity of products or other trading conditions in the relevant market or to
impede or affect the entry of other undertakings into the relevant market.” Articles 18 and 19 set
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In several recent merger investigations, MOFCOM has found that proposed
transactions were likely to lead to heightened barriers to entry and the suppression
of possible growth and development by competitors. As an example in imposing
various conditions on Merck’s acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, MOFCOM
observed “that there were high barriers to entry,” including Merck’s holding more
than 3,500 patents in the liquid crystals display market.150 MOFCOM expressed
similar concerns about high barriers to entry in its second decision unconditionally
blocking a proposed merger. MOFCOM announced that the transaction would
“increase the already high barriers to entry, [and] suppress competitors’ room for
development” in blocking the proposed P3 Network Shipping Alliance among
Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA CGM.151
Special attention also has been paid in recent months to bundling, and the
licensing of intellectual property and technology.
1.

Bundling

AML Article 17(5) forbids undertakings with dominant market positions
“[w]ithout valid justification, tying in products or imposing other unreasonable
trading conditions.”152 In 2013, China’s SAIC began investigating Microsoft’s alleged
bundling of various software products and functions, “raising the prospect of China
revisiting the software bundling issue at the heart of past antitrust complaints
against the firm in the West.”153 In a July 29, 2014, Press Release, SAIC suggested
that its investigation concerns “Microsoft’s Windows operating system and its Office
software suite, and relate[s] to issues of interoperability, bundling and document

150.
151.

152.
153.

forth a number of factors that can be employed in determining whether undertakings have a
dominant market position, including market share, financial and technical status, and the
“difficulty for other undertakings to enter the relevant market.” AML Ch. III, Art. 18. A single
undertaking with a 50% share of a relevant market is presumed under Article 19 to have a
dominant market position.
MOFCOM Conditionally Approves Merck’s Acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 3 (32nd ed. 2014). Additional barriers to entry included photoresist suppliers
having to go through a technical certification process that lasts two to three years. Id.
MOFCOM Prohibits the Formation of the P3 Network Shipping Alliance Among Maersk,
Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA CGM, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4 (32nd ed. 2014). MOFCOM
has consistently voiced concerns about transactions potentially increasing barriers to entry since
2009. See e.g. MOFCOM Announcement [2009] No. 77 Regarding Conditional Approval of Pfizer’s
Acquisition of Wyeth, Sept. 29, 2009, at 4 (3) (iii) (discussing the high barriers to entry in imposing
conditions on Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth).
AML Ch. III, Art. 17(3).
Reuters in Beijing, Chinese antitrust regulator targets Microsoft software bundling, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, August 26, 2014, available at http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/
1580794/chinese-antitrust-regulator-targets. See also Gerry Shih & Paul Carsten, Chinese
antitrust regulator targets Microsoft’s web browser, media player, REUTERS, August 26, 2014,
available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBNOGQ06920140826.
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authentication.”154
SAIC’s high profile and controversial investigation was
accompanied by a corresponding article in The People’s Daily, the CCP’s chief
newspaper, warning foreign companies that: “In the future, the focus on market
order will continue to be constantly enhanced. Every kind of business should adjust
its behavior and thinking to this new regulatory normal.”155
San Diego-based chipmaker Qualcomm also recently found itself punished
severely by China’s NDRC for bundling patent licenses to the sale of chips and
imposing unreasonable conditions on patent licensing and chip sales.156 China’s
NDRC announced in late December, 2014, that it was nearing a settlement with
Qualcomm following a controversial thirteen month probe.157 China defended its
controversial probe of Qualcomm as “in line with the global reaction.”158 A little over
two months later, on February 10, 2015, the NDRC announced its findings that
Qualcomm had abused its dominant market position, and imposed a massive fine of
RMB 6.088 billion, which was equal to 8% of Qualcomm’s 2013 sales revenues in
China.159
Like SAIC, MOFCOM also has shown great interest in curbing potential bundling
by dominant firms. For example, in conditionally approving Merck’s acquisition of
AZ Electronic Materials on April 30, 2014, “MOFCOM found that the acquisition
would give Merck the ability to bundles sales of liquid crystal displays (LCD) and
photoresist.”160 MOFCOM therefore required Merck “not to bundle the sale of or
cross-subsidise LCD and photoresist products or otherwise directly or indirectly
force Chinese companies to purchase the products together.”161
China also has begun announcing substantial penalties against foreign
companies for price-fixing and market sharing. For example, on August 20, 2014,
154.
155.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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Avmeric Dumas-Eumard, China Ramps Up Antitrust Enforcement With Second Round of Raids of
Microsoft Today, CONSTANTINE CANNON ANTITRUST TODAY BLOG, August 6, 2014,
http://www.antitrusttoday.com/2014/08/06/china.
Neil Gough, Chris Buckley & Nick Wingfield, China’s Energetic Enforcement of Antitrust Rules
Alarms Foreign Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
08/11/business/international/china8217s-energetic-enforcement-of-antitrust-rules-alarms-foreignfirms.html.
See e.g. Update on the NDRC’s Investigation of Qualcomm, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 5 (33rd ed.
2014);Reuters, China Investigating Qualcomm’s Pricing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/technology/china-investigating-qualcomms-pricing.html.
See e.g. Michael Perrault, Qualcomm Antitrust Probe Reportedly Nearing End, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY, Dec. 26, 2014, available at http://news.investors.com/technology/122614-732175-qualcomm.
See Zhang Lulu, How Qualcomm got involved in China’s antitrust probes, CHINA. ORG. CN., October
16, 2014, available at http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-10/16/content_33780954.htm.
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3 (35th ed. 2015) citing http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/g2dt/201502/
t2015021a663872.html. The NDRC found that Qualcomm had abused its dominant position in
licensing patents essential to wireless communication to Chinese licensees.
Mofcom Conditionally Approves Merck’s Acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 3 (32nd ed. 2014).
Id.
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the NDRC announced record fines totaling over RMB 1.2 billion against eight
Japanese auto parts and four Japanese bearings manufacturers.162
China’s investigations of Microsoft, Merck, Qualcomm, and others have sparked
fierce protests of unfair discrimination against foreign companies.163 China
inevitably responds to criticisms of discrimination against foreign companies by
arguing that its AML regulators have not been afraid to pursue local investigations.
They point out that China’s AML enforcers have brought numerous local price-fixing
and market sharing cases.164 Similarly, in the abuse of dominance sector, China
can point to several local bundling investigations and cases.165 For example, on July
30, 2014, China’s SAIC fined the Inner Mongolia Tobacco Company (Chifeng
Tobacco) “for abusing its dominant market position in the cigarette wholesale
market in Chifeng by bundling the sales of various brands of cigarettes.”166
Similarly, on July 28, 2014, a Beijing trial court fined Baidu for bundling Qihoo 360’s
software with Baidu’s products.167 However, such minor investigations and cases
are unlikely to quell the rising storm of foreign protests against China’s allegedly
discriminatory and protectionist AML enforcement activities.
2.

Licensing of Intellectual Property and Patents

Expansively pressing for the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
licensing of intellectual property rights (IPR) is perhaps the single area where the
Chinese have been the most aggressive against foreign companies. Although AML
162.
163.

164.

165.

166.
167.

NDRC Imposes Record Fines on Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing Manufacturers for Price-Fixing,
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 2 (33rd ed. 2014). The Japanese companies included such giants as
Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsuba, and Sumitomo Electric.
See, e.g., Gough, Buckley & Wingfield, supra note 155 (“Foreign companies worry that
investigations could represent the rise of a newer, subtler form of protectionism, one cloaked in
regulatory impartiality but intended to promote Chinese companies, especially the big, powerful
state-owned companies”); Bruce Einhorn, Foreigners Cry Foul as China Widens Antimonopoly
Probes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 14, 2014, available at http://www.businessweek.com.
printer/articles/219299-foreigners. (“The backlash to China’s latest campaign against foreign
companies has begun. The country’s antimonopoly enforcers have been on a tear….”).
See, e.g., Hainan Price Bureau Fines Aerated Bricks Cartel, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 3 (33rd ed.
2014); Three Cement Companies in Jilin Province Fined RMB 114 Million for Price-Fixing, CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 2 (34th ed. 2014); Insurance Industry Players in Zhejiang Province Fined More
than RMB 110 Million, Id. at 1.
As an example, at the annual World Economic Forum in Tianjin in September 2014, Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang argued that “only 10% of AML investigations involved foreign companies.
Premier Li defended China’s antitrust enforcement, stating that Chinese AML enforcement
agencies would not enforce regulations selectively or target certain groups of companies.” CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 5 (34th ed. 2014). Anti-Unfair Competition Bureau Director-General Ren
Airong similarly argued that of thirty-nine then current SAIC investigations, only two involved
foreign companies. Id.
Inner Mongolia AIC Sanctions Abuse of Dominance in the Cigarette Wholesale Market, CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 4 (33rd ed. 2014).
Baidu Loses Bundled Sales Case Against Qihoo 360, CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4 (33rd ed. 2014).
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Article 55 initially exempts from its ambit the use of IPR, it immediately adds:
“however, this Law is applicable to conducts of undertakings that abuse their
intellectual property rights to eliminate or restrict competition.”168 China’s AML
enforcement authorities have interpreted and applied Article 55 aggressively and
expansively, especially in the context of requiring FRAND licensing of IPR in
conditional merger and acquisition approvals.
On June 11, 2014, SAIC released a revised draft regulations concerning the abuse
of IPR.169 SAIC ultimately published its final Regulation on the Prohibition of
Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition Through the Abuse of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR Regulation) on April 7, 2015.170 Articles 4 through 15 describe
at length potential prohibited uses of IPR, and are especially pointed at
“undertakings with dominant market positions.”171 Article 1 observes that the rules
have been drafted “in order to protect competition and encourage innovation, as well
as to prohibit the use of [IPR] by undertakings to eliminate or restrict
competition.”172 The IPR Regulation effectively imposes obligations on dominant
companies to license their IPR on “reasonable terms” if that IPR is an essential
facility for production or operation unless they can provide a valid reason for not
doing so.173
Prior to SAIC’s new IPR rules, several major Chinese cases addressed IPR issues.
In the Huawei v. InterDigital cases,174 Chinese courts found that InterDigital had
abused its dominant position in exercising its IPR rights through such conduct as
bundling the licensing of its standard essential patents (SEPs) with non-SEPs.175
168.
169.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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AML Ch. VII, Art. 55. See also WANG, supra note 10, at 217-229.
See Rules of the Administration for Industry and Commerce on the Prohibition of Abuses of
Intellectual Property Rights for the Purposes of Eliminating or Restricting Competition, June 11,
2014. (Draft IP Rules) SAIC hopes to finalize the regulations in 2015. SAIC has been drafting the
regulations since 2009, and has received numerous comments from Chinese and foreign entities
throughout the long process. Article 5 of the draft rules includes several important “safe harbor”
provisions.
See CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 2 (36th ed. 2015).
See Draft IP Rules Arts. 4-15. A full discussion of SAIC’s draft rules is beyond the scope of this
paper.
Draft IP Rules Art. 1. Article 2 adds that “[t]he AML shares the same goal with intellectual property
protection, which is to promote innovation and competition, improve efficiency and consumer
welfare and public interest of the society.”
Id., citing http://www.saic.gov.cn/ywdt/gsyw/zjyw/xxb/201504/t20150414_155126.html.
Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, Huawei v. InterDigital, Feb. 4, 2013, [2011] Shen Zhong Fa
Zhi Min Chu Zi No. 857 and No. 858; Guangdong High People’s Court, Huawei v. InterDigital, Oct.
16, 2013, [2013] Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 and 306.
See Ye Ruosi, Zhu Jianjun & Chen Wenquan, Determination of Whether Abuse of Dominance by
Standard Essential Patent Owners Constitutes Monopoly: Comments on the Antitrust Lawsuit
Huawei v. InterDigital, 3 ELECTR. INTELL. PROP. 46 (2013). On May 22, 2014, the NDRC announced
the suspension of its investigation into InterDigital after InterDigital reached a settlement with
Chinese company Huawei, and committed to not charge Chinese companies discriminatory and
high licensing fees, not bundle non-SEPs with SEP licenses, not require that Chinese companies
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Building upon such cases, SAIC’s rules contain ten articles that address the
potential abuse of dominance in exercising IPR. “With regard to the types of abusive
conduct, the draft SAIC IPR Regulation focuses on refusal to license; exclusive
dealing; tying [bundling]; imposing unreasonable conditions; discrimination; patent
pools; standard essential patents; copy right collecting societies; and abuses through
warning letters.”176 A number of unreasonable conditions in dominant companies’
exercise of their IPR also are set forth.177
Considered together with MOFCOM’s aggressive use of IPR licensing
requirements in its conditional approval of mergers,178 it appears that China
increasingly will use its AML to help its indigenous companies gain favorable access
to IPR held by foreign companies. This aggressive posture likely reflects China’s
recognition that “the country’s innovators still have a way to go before they can meet
the Communist Party’s expectations.”179 While “China has strengthened its
commitment to R & D to support the government’s drive towards innovation…, [t]he
reality is that China remains heavily reliant on foreign IP.”180 Even though China
has surpassed the United States and Japan in filing patents, “many of them [have]
little value; they [have] been filed to meet political targets or attract funding.”181
Consequently, “[a]ccess to technology and development of domestic, ‘indigenous’
technology are key factors in China’s development strategy.”182 Such developments
lend strong credence to increasing foreign concerns that China will use its AML to
promote its domestic research and development needs.

176.
177.
178.

179.

180.
181.
182.

license their IP for free to InterDigital, and not force Chinese companies to accept unreasonable
licensing conditions through litigation. See NDRC Suspends Its Investigation Into InterDigital,
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 7 (32nd ed. 2014).
Adrain Emch & Liyang Hou, Antitrust Regulation of IPRs –China’s First Proposal, COMPETITION
POLICY INT’L 7 (2014).
Id. at 8. These include among others exclusive dealing and exclusive grant-backs for derived
technology.
See, e.g., MOFCOM Conditionally Approves Merck’s Acquisition of AZ Electronic Materials, CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 3 (32nd ed. 2014) (discussing MOFCOM’s requirements that Merck “offer LCD
patent licenses on a non-exclusive, non-transferable, fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
basis”).
Bruce Einhorn, China’s Government Admits Chinese Patents Are Pretty Bad, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, June 23, 2014. See also Christina Larson, A Peek Into the ‘Black Box’ of Where
China’s Hefty R & D Budget Goes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2014, (discussing the
massive graft and corruption in China’s research fields).
Dr. Zhan Hao, SAIC Moves Closer to Antitrust Rules for IP, CHINA LAW VISION, July 10, 2014,
available at http://www.chinalawvision.com/2014/07/articles/competitionantitrust-law-of-the/saicmov.
OSNOS, supra note 26, at 320. Similarly, while China is producing more scientific papers than
anywhere but the United States, they are not even ranked in the top ten in terms of quality. Id.
Osnos argues that academic fraud is still rampant in China. Id.
Emch & Hou, supra note 9, at 10.
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III.China’s Recent AML Enforcement Activities Have Drawn
Harsh and Scathing Criticisms From Western Governments
and Business Interests
China’s aggressive AML enforcement activities are coming under increasing
international scrutiny and rapidly escalating criticism. Perhaps the harshest
criticism has come from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which released a scathing
report on September 9, 2014, on the “Competing Interest in China’s Competition
Law Enforcement.”183 In its well-written and comprehensive 85-page Report, the
Chamber alleges that China’s AML and its enforcement are not living up to the ideal
of competitive markets, and that China is using its AML “to advance policy and boost
national champions.”184 The Chamber is especially appalled by what it considers to
be China’s “[s]ystemic, officially sanctioned curtailment of IP rights,”185 and the
“[d]ue process deficiencies, [which] facilitate these problems.”186 The Chamber adds
that “foreign companies suffer disproportionately from China’s patterns of enforcing
the AML. In fact, all transactions blocked or conditionally approved to date have
involved foreign companies, and the curtailment of IP rights appears designed to
strengthen the bargaining position of domestic licenses.”187 Indeed, the Chamber
alleges that China’s AML enforcement is violating the commitments that China
undertook in joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).188
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is hardly alone in voicing such concerns. For
example, in a September 2014 Report, the U.S.—China Business Council (USCBC)
observed that “foreign companies have well-founded concerns about how
investigations are conducted and decided. China’s legal framework for antitrust
enforcement provides opportunities for protectionism and industrial policy to sway
decisions.”189
Joining this growing chorus, the USCC filed a lengthy report with the United
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United States Chamber of Commerce, Competing Interests in China’s Competition Law
Enforcement: China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Application and the Role of Industrial Policy, Sept. 9,
2014.
Id. at ii. The Chamber adds that “[t]he beneficiaries of these policies are often Chinese national
champions in industries that China considers strategic, such as commodities and high technology.”
Id. at 2.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 2.
Neil Gough, China’s Antitrust Campaign Seen as Possible Breach of W.T.O. Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/business/international/us-group-says-china.
U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, COMPETITION POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 13 (2014), available
at https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/AML%202014%20Report%20FINAL_0.pdf.
The
Report adds that “Chinese competition practices can create de facto discrimination against foreign
companies by not giving proper weight to market considerations.” Id.
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States Congress in November, 2014.190 Noting the steadily growing trade imbalance
between the United States and China, the Commission concluded that “[t]he
bilateral trade imbalance is driven, in large part, by China’s mercantilist and statedirected policies.”191 The Commission additionally alleged that “[i]n 2014, China
ramped up its use of Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) against foreign firms in what
appears to be unequal enforcement in order to create favorable market conditions
for Chinese competitors.”192 The American Chamber of Commerce in China and the
European Union Chamber of Commerce have issued similar 2014 reports “accusing
China of unfair enforcement of the AML.”193
More recently, on December 5, 2014, the Congressional Research Service
prepared a Report for Congress summarizing the various business community
criticisms of China’s AML enforcement.194 The scope and intensity of such concerns
should not be minimized. John Frisbie, the President of the USCBC, noted that a
recent survey “found that 86% of respondents said they are least somewhat
concerned about the way the AML has been implemented.”195 Widespread reported
concerns included unfair treatment and discrimination, a lack of due process and
regulatory transparency, lengthy time for merger reviews, and the process through
which remedies and fines are determined.196
Various United States antitrust officials also have joined the chorus. For
example, on September 16, 2014, Federal Trade Commissioner Maureen K.
Ohlhausen expressed strong concerns that “the Chinese may be moving away from
rather than towards international norms.”197 Commissioner Ohlhausen expressed
strong support for “a growing chorus claiming that the Chinese are using the AML
to promote industrial policy.”198 FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has voiced similar
190.
191.
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195.
196.
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198.

U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2014), available
at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF.
Id. at 3. The Report continues: “Although China promised extensive market reforms when it joined
the WTO, it has been reluctant to implement them. Instead, the Chinese government has
institutionalized preferences for state-owned enterprises and favored industries, particularly in
areas designated as ‘strategic.’” Id.
Id. at 60. The Report adds: “Chinese regulators and state media have disproportionately targeted
foreign firms operating in China with accusations ranging from monopolistic behavior to
exploitation of Chinese consumers.” Id.
Id. See also Michael Martina, EU Lobby Piles in on Foreign Criticism of China’s Antitrust
Enforcement, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/uk-china-antitrusteu-idUKKBN0H40SB20140909.
WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA–U.S. TRADE ISSUES 25-27 (2014), available
at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=761176.
U.S.–China Business Relations: Rough Waters Ahead?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, UNIV. OF PA. (Dec.
14, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/u-s-china-business-relations-face-roughwaters-ahead.
Id.
Ohlhausen, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 35, at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
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concerns,199 as has United States Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
Bill Baer.200 Furthermore, “China and the United States’ adversarial relationship
has been marked by frequent litigation in the World Trade Organization (WTO).”201
Not surprisingly, Chinese officials deny that they are targeting or discriminating
against foreign companies in enforcing their AML.202 For example, on September
10, 2014, the day after the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Report was released, Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang delivered a speech to 1000 business leaders attending a World
Economic Forum meeting in Tianjin. China Premier Li observed: “China continues
to welcome foreign investment, and the door will open even further.”203 The next
day, Key Chinese AML enforcement officials held an additional briefing to refute the
various allegations.204 Similarly, on April 15, 2015, Zhang Handong, the new
Director General of the NDRC Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau, met
with the Chairman of the USCC and representatives of such companies as GE, Dell,
and Intel in an attempt to convince them “that antitrust enforcement in China does
not discriminate against any particular company or sector.”205
Unfortunately, notwithstanding China’s vigorous protestations and denials, a
review of China’s AML enforcement activities since 2008 lends strong credence to
the allegations that the primary targets of major AML enforcement initiatives have
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Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at Georgetown University’s Global
Antitrust Conference, Standards-Essential Patents and Licensing: An Antitrust Enforcement
Perspective (Sept. 10, 2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/582451/140915georgetownlaw.pdf (expressing concerns that China’s approach to IPR
and AML suggests “an enforcement policy focused on reducing royalty payments for local
implementers as a matter of industrial policy, rather than protecting competition and long-run
consumer welfare”).
Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as
Prepared for Delivery at Fordham University School of Law’s 41st Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy, International Antitrust Enforcements Progress Made,
Work To Be Done (Sept. 12, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517736/download.
Indeed, during his 2012 election campaign, President Obama told China to behave like a “grown
up.” Matt Spetalnick & Doug Palmer, Obama to China: Behave Like a “Grown Up,” REUTERS (Nov.
14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/us-apec-idUSTRE7AB12920111114.
Velk, Gong & Zuckerbrot, supra note 16, at 9.
See e.g., Neil Gough, China’s Antitrust Campaign Seen as Possible Breach of W.T.O. Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/business/international/us-group-sayschina-could-be-violating-trade-accords.html (stating that “senior Chinese officials have repeatedly
said that they are not focusing specifically on foreign companies and that equal treatment is being
extended to all”).
Dexter Roberts, Premier Li Keqiang Says China Market Is Still Open to Foreign Investors,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-09-10/chinas-premier-toinvestors-we-want-you. Premier Li defended China’s antitrust enforcement, stating that “only 10%
of AML investigations involved foreign companies.” See CHINA COMPETITION RESEARCH CTR.,
CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN, CHINA RESPONDS TO CONCERNS ABOUT AML ENFORCEMENT 5
(34th ed. 2014).
See CHINA COMPETITION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 203, at 5-6.
CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 5-6 (36th ed. 2015).
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been foreign companies. Chinese officials and their CCP-controlled press have been
unapologetic in simultaneously issuing warnings that foreign companies need “to
get used to tougher scrutiny,”206 and “must strictly comply with Chinese rules and
laws and fulfill their social obligations.”207
China’s unwillingness to give more serious consideration to the escalating
allegations and criticisms of its AML enforcement activities is cause for grave
concern. Given the rising rhetoric and concerns on both sides, it seems that we may
be headed for a dangerous clash sparked by two very different antitrust regulatory
systems.208

IV. Conclusion
China’s recent AML enforcement activities and initiatives confirm that China is
determined to chart its own course, and not be “the tail of someone else’s dog.”209
China’s current course indicates that China will aggressively pursue AML
enforcement with the goal of creating “fair market competition” and protecting the
“consumer and public interests” of China’s citizens. China is likely to continue using
its AML to protect its long-term security and economic interest, and to protect the
competitive opportunities for its small and medium-sized businesses. In so doing,
China is likely to continue aggressively seeking to break down perceived barriers to
entry and to block exclusionary practices by firms with perceived dominant market
positions.
Like it or not, the United States and other Western countries and businesses are
going to have to accept that China views itself as different, and that its view of its
“socialist market economy” is vastly different from our view of free markets.210 We
need to come to grips with the reality that Chinese antitrust in the next decade is
unlikely to mimic our post-Chicago antitrust system, and its grounding in
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See Gough, Buckley & Wingfield, supra note 155 (stating that “[l]ate last week, The People’s Daily,
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FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 322.
See, e.g., JACQUES, supra note 16, at 563 (stating that “[t]he desire to measure China primarily,
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can easily become an excuse for not bothering to understand or respect the wisdom and specificities
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supposedly neutral and scientific neoclassical economic models.
Rather than wasting time criticizing China and trying to lure it into following
current American models, we should humbly ask ourselves whether we might learn
from the Chinese and their Confucian traditions and values. As this author
previously has argued, China should be lauded for seeking to pursue an aggressive
antitrust policy that takes into account Confucian norms of ethics, morals, and
fairness, and seeks to inspire increased corporate social responsibility.211
On the other hand, the Chinese and their AML enforcers are going to need to pay
more attention going forward to their own Confucian traditions and values, as
well.212 Ongoing business and governmental corruption in China must be
aggressively addressed. Furthermore, the Chinese need to acknowledge and
realistically address the pressures on their AML enforcers to aggressively target
foreign companies in order to protect and bolster indigenous Chinese companies and
businesses. Instead of trying to pretend that they are acting neutrally and
objectively in their AML enforcement, the Chinese need to find better ways to focus
primarily on competition policies, as opposed to industrial protectionism. The
ultimate regulatory question must become what is best for economic competition in
China, rather than what is best for the CCP’s long-term interest in maintaining its
tight grip on power.
As always, the future is uncertain. But the stakes could not be higher. Whether
we like it or not, China’s and our economies are inextricably linked and positively
correlated.213 Both China and the West must continue their ongoing dialogues, and
seek to continue building strong economic, cultural, and political bridges.214 After
all, much more than future international antitrust enforcement is at stake.
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